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Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq
remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency,
compounded by burgeoning sectarian violence.  According to its November 30, 2005,
“Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain
in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as
a host for radical Islamic terrorists.  President Bush has said he believes that, over the
longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a
partner in the global war on terrorism.  However, mounting U.S. casualties and
financial costs — without clear signs of security progress — have  intensified a
debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind
down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals.
President Bush, particularly after a visit to Baghdad on June 13, 2006, has
asserted that U.S. policy in Iraq is  showing important successes, demonstrated by
two elections (January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-
term parliament and government, a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution
(October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security forces, and economic growth.
While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration
has been working to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly
the security institutions; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein
but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds.  The
Administration believes that it has largely healed a rift with some European countries
over the decision to invade Iraq, and it points to NATO and other nations’
contributions of training for Iraqi security forces and government personnel.
Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in
Iraq is failing and that major new policy initiatives are required.  Some believe that
U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop levels
and that sectarian violence threatens to place U.S. forces in the middle of an all out
civil war in Iraq.  Others believe that a U.S. move to withdraw might undercut
popular support for the insurgency and force compromise among Iraq’s factions.
Still others maintain that  the U.S. approach should focus not on counter-insurgent
combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents,
a plan the Administration says it is now moving toward under an approach termed
“clear, hold, and build.”  These issues are expected to be debated during House
consideration of H.Res. 861 on June 15, 2006.  
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth
Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations,
by Steve Bowman; and CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign
Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and
Christopher Blanchard. 
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Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty  (1921-1958).1  Iraq had been a
province of the Ottoman empire until British forces defeated the Ottomans in World
War I and took control of what is now Iraq in 1918.  Britain had tried to take Iraq
from the Ottomans in Iraq earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in
1916.  Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis (as did the
Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt
in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941, during World War II.  Iraq’s first
Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who,
advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”),  led the Arab revolt
against the Ottoman Empire during World War I.  Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal
I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939.
Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who was only four years old.
A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said,
a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times
during 1930-1958.  Faysal II ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim
on July 14, 1958.  Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military
alliance.  Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was
rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam’s rule. The Baath
Party was founded in the 1940s by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq as
a socialist, pan-Arab movement, the aim of which was to reduce religious and
sectarian schisms among Arabs.  
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif.  In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
(and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule.  Arif
was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd
al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968.  Following the
Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein,
a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council.  In that position, Saddam  developed overlapping
security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s
institutions, including the military.  On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at
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2 Bush, George H.W., and Brent Scowcroft.  A World Transformed.  Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1998.
3 Congress more than doubled the budget  for covert support to the opposition groups to
about $40 million for FY1993, from previous reported levels of about $15 million to $20
million.  Sciolino, Elaine.  “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.”  New York Times,
June 2, 1992. 
Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq.  Under Saddam Hussein,
secular Shiites held high party positions, but Sunnis, mostly from Saddam’s home
town of Tikrit, dominated the highest party and security positions.  Saddam’s regime
repressed Iraq’s Shiites after the February 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring
Iran partly because Iraq feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements, emboldened by
Iran, would  try to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment  
Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse
Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the
Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam.  That Administration decided not to militarily
overthrow Saddam Hussein in the 1991 war because the United Nations had
approved only the liberation of Kuwait, because the Arab states in the coalition
opposed an advance to Baghdad, and because the Administration feared becoming
bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.2  Within days of the war’s end (February
28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurds in northern Iraq, emboldened
by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support, rebelled.  The  Shiite revolt
nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni Muslim Republican Guard forces were
pulled back into Iraq before engaging U.S. forces and were intact to suppress the
rebels.  Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States for not intervening to prevent
suppression of the uprisings.  Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone”
set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and remained
autonomous thereafter.
About two months after the failure of these uprisings, President George H.W.
Bush reportedly sent Congress an intelligence finding that the United States would
try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein.  The Administration
apparently believed that a coup from within the regime could produce a favorable
government without fragmenting Iraq.  After a reported July 1992 coup failed, there
was a U.S. decision to shift to supporting the Kurdish, Shiite, and other
oppositionists that were coalescing into a broad movement.3  
Support for Iraq’s opposition was one facet of broader U.S. policy to pressure
Saddam Hussein.  The main elements of U.S. containment policy during the 1990s
consisted of U.N. Security Council-authorized weapons inspections, an international
economic embargo, and U.S.-led enforcement of “no fly zones” over northern and
southern Iraq.  The implementation of these policies is discussed in greater detail in
CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights
Violations, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.  
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sentenced to 22 years in prison.  The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors
a total of $400 million.
5 Risen, James, and David Johnston.  “Chalabi Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code,”
New York Times, June 2, 2004. 
6 Brinkley, Joel.  “Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90’s Attacks,” New
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Major Anti-Saddam Factions
Although U.S. policy after the 1991 war emphasized containment, the United
States built ties to and progressively increased support for  several of the secular and
religious opposition factions discussed below.  Some of these factions have provided
major figures in post-Saddam politics, while also fielding militias that are allegedly
conducting acts of  sectarian reprisals in post-Saddam Iraq. 
Secular Groups:  Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Iraq National
Accord (INA).  In 1992, the two main Kurdish parties and several Shiite Islamist
groups coalesced into the “Iraqi National Congress (INC),” on a platform of human
rights, democracy, pluralism, and “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy).  However, many
observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups have
authoritarian leaderships.  The INC’s Executive Committee selected Ahmad Chalabi,
a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent banking family, to run the INC on a daily
basis.  Chalabi, who is about 64 years old, was educated in the United States
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a mathematician.  His father was
president of the Senate in the monarchy that was overthrown in the 1958 military
coup, and the family fled to Jordan.  He taught math at the American University of
Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan.  He later ran afoul
of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly
with some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989.4  (A table on U.S.
appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).
As an Iraqi governance structure was established, Chalabi was one of the
rotating presidents of  the Iraq Governing Council (IGC, president during September
2003).  In a fallout with his former U.S. backers, U.S.-backed Iraqi police raided INC
headquarters in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing documents as part of  an
investigation of various allegations, including provision of U.S.  intelligence to Iran.5
The case was later dropped.  Since 2004, Chalabi  has tried to ally with Shiite
Islamist factions; he ran on the main Shiite Islamist  slate for the January 30, 2005,
elections and subsequently became one of three deputy prime ministers, with a focus
on economic issues.  Chalabi temporarily  served as Oil Minister in December 2005,
and he continues to play a large role in oil decisions.  
Another secular group, the Iraq National Accord (INA), was founded after Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by Saudi Arabia but reportedly later
earned the patronage of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).6  It is led by Dr. Iyad
al-Allawi, a Baathist who purportedly helped Saddam Hussein silence Iraqi dissidents
CRS-4
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9 For an extended discussion, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados.
in Europe in the mid-1970s.7  Allawi, who is about 60 years old (born 1946 in
Baghdad), fell out with Saddam in the mid-1970s, became a neurologist and presided
over  the Iraqi Student Union in Europe.  He survived an alleged Saddam regime
assassination attempt in London in 1978.  He is a secular Shiite Muslim, but many
INA members are Sunnis. 
In 1996, the Clinton Administration shifted support to the INA after squabbling
among other opposition groups reduced their viability.8  However, the INA proved
penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services, which arrested or executed over 100 INA
activists  in June 1996.  In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into
northern Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from the PUK.  The
incursion enabled Baghdad to also rout remaining INC and INA operatives in the
north.  Allawi has emerged as a significant figure in post-Saddam politics, as
discussed below, including serving as interim Prime Minister (2004-2005).
 
The Kurds.9  The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, are
probably the most pro-U.S. of all major groups.  They have a historic fear of
persecution by the Arab majority and want to, at the very least, preserve the
autonomy of the post-1991 Gulf war period.  Many younger Kurds  want to go
beyond autonomy  to outright independence.  The Kurds appear to be  positioning
themselves to secure the city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds covet as a source of oil, and
possibly part of the city of Mosul.  The Kurds achieved language in the new
constitution requiring a vote by December 2007 on whether Kirkuk might formally
join the Kurdish administered region.  For now,  both major Kurdish factions are
participating in Iraqi politics, the PUK more so than the KDP.  PUK leader  Talabani
was IGC president in November 2003, and the KDP’s  Barzani led it in April 2004.
Talabani is  Iraq’s president.  On June 12, 2005, the 111-seat Kurdish regional
assembly (also elected on January 30, 2005) named Barzani “president of Kurdistan.”
Yet, Barzani participated extensively in negotiations on the new Iraqi constitution.
Shiite Islamists:  Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, and Sadr.
Shiite Islamist organizations  have emerged as the strongest factions in post-Saddam
politics; Shiites constitute about 60% of the population but were under-represented
in all pre-2003 governments.  Several Shiite factions cooperated with the U.S. regime
change efforts of the 1990s, but others had no contact with the United States.  The
undisputed Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,  maintained a low
profile during Saddam Hussein’s regime and was not involved in  U.S.-backed
regime change efforts during the 1990s.  As the “marja-e-taqlid” (source of
emulation) and, since 1992, as the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the
Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of seminaries), he is a major political
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Najafi, of Pakistani origin. 
11 For information on Sistani’s views, see his website at [http://www.sistani.org].
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force in post-Saddam politics.10  He  has a network of  agents (wakils) throughout
Iraq and in countries where there are large Shiite communities.  He was instrumental
in putting together the united slate of Shiite Islamist movements in the 2005 elections
(“United Iraqi Alliance,” UIA).  
Sistani, about 82 years old, was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before
relocating to Najaf at the age of 21.  His mentor, the former head of the Hawza, was
Ayatollah Abol Qasem Musavi-Khoi.  Like Khoi, Sistani generally opposes a direct
role for clerics in government, but he believes in clerical supervision of political
leaders.  He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic culture and not become Westernized,
favoring modest dress for women and  curbs on sales of  alcohol and Western music
and entertainment.11  He  suffers from heart problems that required treatment in the
United Kingdom in August 2004. 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).  Within
the UIA, SCIRI shares power with the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party and the faction of
Moqtada Al Sadr.  SCIRI founders were in exile in Iran after a major crackdown in
1980 by Saddam, who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi Shiite Islamists of trying to
overthrow him.  During Khomeini’s exile in Najaf (1964-1978), he was hosted by
Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, father of the Hakim brothers that founded SCIRI.
The Ayatollah was then head of the Hawza.  Although it  was a member of the INC
in the early 1990s, SCIRI refused to accept U.S. funds, although it did have contacts
with the United States.
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric, is now SCIRI’s  leader; he
served on the IGC and has been elected to parliament at the top of  the UIA slate in
each of the 2005 elections, but he has taken no government position.  One of his top
aides, Bayan Jabr, is now Finance Minister.  He served recently as Interior Minister,
and was accused of packing the police forces with members of  SCIRI’s “Badr
Brigades” militia (discussed below).  SCIRI leaders say they do not seek to establish
an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but SCIRI reportedly receives substantial amounts
of financial and other aid from Iran.  SCIRI also runs several media outlets. 
Da’wa Party/Ibrahim al-Jafari  and  Nuri al-Maliki.  Another major Shiite
Islamist party is the  Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party.  It  did not directly join the U.S.-led
effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein during the 1990s.  Its leader is Ibrahim al-Jafari,
who is about 56 years old (born in 1950 in Karbala) and was Prime Minister during
April 2005-April 2006.  A Da’wa activist since 1966, he fled to Iran in 1980 to
escape Saddam’s crackdown on the Da’wa, later going to London.  Jafari served on
the IGC,12 and he was deputy president in Allawi’s interim government.  Opposition
from Sunnis and Kurds caused him to withdraw as nominee for the new unity
government and be replaced by number two Da’wa leader, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. 
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Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki
Born in 1950 in Karbala, Maliki has belonged to Da’wa Party since 1968.  Fled Iraq in
1980 after Saddam banned the party, initially to Iran.  Fled to Syria when he refused
Iran’s orders that he join pro-Iranian Shiite militia groups fighting Iraq during the Iran-
Iraq war.  Headed Da’wa offices in Syria and Lebanon and edited Da’wa Party
newspaper. Elected to National Assembly in January 2005 and chaired its “security
committee.”  Believed to support Kurds’ efforts to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdish
region.
Although there is no public evidence that Jafari or Maliki were  involved in any
terrorist  activity, the Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa  allegedly committed a May 1985
attempted assassination of the  Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on
the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait.  Lebanese Hizballah was founded by
Lebanese clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and Khomeini, and there continue
to be personal and ideological linkages between Hizballah and Da’wa (as well as
with SCIRI).  The Hizballah activists who  held U.S. hostages in Lebanon during the
1980s attempted to link release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa prisoners
held by Kuwait for those attacks in the 1980s. 
Moqtada al-Sadr Faction (“Sadrists”).  Moqtada Al Sadr is emerging as
a major figure in Iraq.  He is the lone surviving son of the revered Ayatollah
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (the Ayatollah was killed, along with his other two sons,
by regime security forces in 1999 after he began agitating against Saddam).  He has
been viewed as a young firebrand who lacks religious and political weight, a view
that first took hold on April 10, 2003, when his supporters allegedly stabbed to death
Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi and head of his
London-based Khoi Foundation, shortly after Khoi’s U.S.-backed arrival in Iraq.
However, the established Shiite factions, as well as Iranian diplomats, are building
ties to him because of his large following.  
By participating fully in the December 15, 2005 elections, Sadr appeared to
distance himself from his uprisings in 2003 and 2004, although tensions between
Sadr’s militia forces and international (particulary British) forces in Iraq are flaring
again in 2006.  During 2003-2004, he used Friday prayer sermons in Kufa (near
Najaf) to agitate for a U.S. withdrawal, and he did not join any Iraqi governments.
In the January 30, 2005, elections, Sadr started moving into the political process by
permitting some of  his supporters to join the UIA slate.  Pro-Sadr candidates also
won pluralities in several southern Iraqi provincial council elections and hold 6 seats
on Basra’s 41-seat provincial council.  Three ministers in the 2005-2006 government
were Sadr supporters. 
Smaller Shiite Factions.  One other Shiite grouping, called Fadilah (Virtue),
holds about 15 seats in the 2006-2010  parliament as part of the UIA coalition.  Loyal
to Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, it is a splinter group of Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction
and is perceived as somewhat anti-U.S.  It also holds seats on several provincial
councils in the Shiite provinces and controls the protection force (Facilities
Protection Service) for the oil installations in Basra.  This has made Fadilah a major
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force in that city, helping it, with Sadr’s help, to try to wrest control of the provincial
government there. 
Other Shiite parties operating in southern Iraq include fighters who challenged
Saddam Hussein’s forces in the southern marsh areas, around the town of Amara,
north of Basra.  One goes by the name Hizbollah-Iraq and is headed by guerrilla
leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the IGC.  Hizbollah-Iraq apparently
plays a major role in policing Amara and environs and has one cabinet member in the
new government (minister of state, no portfolio).  Another pro-Iranian grouping,
which wields a militia, is called Thar Allah (Vengeance of God).  A smaller Shiite
Islamist organization, the Islamic Amal (Action) Organization, is headed by
Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a  moderate cleric.  Its power base is in
Karbala, and it conducted attacks there against  regime organs in the 1980s.
Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s regime in the 1980s and 1990s.
Islamic Amal won two seats in the January 30 election and has a member in the new
cabinet (Minister of Civil Society Affairs). 
Clinton Administration Policy/Iraq Liberation Act
From the time of Iraq’s defeat of the INC and INA in August 1996 until 1998,
the Clinton Administration had little contact with opposition groups.  During 1997-
1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections
led to growing congressional calls to overthrow Saddam, beginning with an FY1998
supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 105-174).  The sentiment was reflected even
more strongly in the “Iraq Liberation Act”  (ILA, P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998).
This law, signed by President Clinton despite doubts about opposition capabilities,
was viewed as an expression of congressional support for the concept of  promoting
an Iraqi insurgency with U.S. air power.  The Bush Administration has cited the ILA
as evidence of a bipartisan consensus that Saddam should be toppled.  
The ILA stated that it should be the policy of the United States to “support
efforts” to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein.  In mid-November 1998,
President Clinton publicly articulated that regime change was a component of U.S.
policy toward Iraq.  Section 8 states that the act should not be construed as
authorizing the use of U.S. military force to achieve regime change.  The ILA did not
specifically terminate after Saddam Hussein was removed from power.  Section 7
provides for post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi groups with “democratic
goals.”  The law also gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million worth
of defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting funds, to
opposition groups designated by the Administration.  
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Main recipient of  U.S. aid to anti-Saddam opposition during
1990s.  Chalabi, touted by some in Bush Administration prior to
2003 war,  fell afoul of U.S. officials in 2003-2004.  No seats in





Consisted of ex-Baathists and ex-military in efforts to topple
Saddam in 1990s.  Allawi was interim Prime Minister (June 2004-
April 2005).  Won 40 seats in January 2005 election but only 25 in
December 2005.  
Kurds/KDP and
PUK
Two main Kurdish factions.  Talabani became president of Iraq
after January 2005 and remains so.  Barzani has tried to secure his
clan’s base in the Kurdish north.  Together, field up to 100,000
peshmerga militia.  Their joint slate won 75 seats in January




Undisputed leading Shiite theologian in Iraq.  No formal position
in government but has used his broad Shiite popularity to become
instrumental in major questions facing it and in U.S. decisions on
Iraq.  Helped forge UIA and brokered compromise over the






Best-organized and most pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist party.  It was
established in 1982 by Tehran to centralize Shiite Islamist
movements in Iraq.  First leader, Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim,
killed by bomb in Najaf in August 2003.  Controls 5,000 fighter
“Badr Brigades” militia.  As part of United Iraqi Alliance (UIA-
128 total seats in December election), it has about 30 of its
members in parliament.  Supports formation of large Shiite
“region” composed of nine southern provinces.  
Da’wa (Islamic
Call) Party
Oldest organized Shiite Islamist party (founded 1957), active
against Saddam Hussein in early 1980s.  Founder, Mohammad
Baqr al-Sadr, was ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and was hung
by Saddam regime in 1980.  Does not have an organized militia. 
Has a lower proportion of  clerics than does SCIRI.  Part of UIA,
controls about 28 seats in parliament.  
Moqtada Al-
Sadr Faction
Young (about 31) relative of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr
and son of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq Al Sadr, was in Iraq
during Saddam’s reign.  Inherited father’s  political base in “Sadr
City,” a large (2 million population) Shiite district of Baghdad. 
Mercurial, has both challenged and worked with U.S. personnel in
Iraq.  Formed “Mahdi Army” militia in 2003 which now has as
many as 20,000 fighters.  Now part of UIA, controls 32 seats in
new parliament and ministries of health, transportation, and
agriculture.  Opposes formation of  Shiite “region” in the south.  
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The signing of the ILA coincided with new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections.  On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed  (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998).  On February 5,
1999, President Clinton made seven opposition groups eligible to receive U.S.
military assistance under the ILA (P.D. 99-13):  INC; INA; SCIRI; KDP; PUK; the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);13 and the small Movement for
Constitutional Monarchy (MCM).  In May 1999, the Clinton Administration
provided $5 million worth of training and “non-lethal” defense articles under the
ILA.  During 1999-2000, about 150 oppositionists underwent civil administration
training at Hurlburt air base in Florida, including Defense Department-run civil
affairs training to administer a post-Saddam government.  The Hurlburt trainees were
not brought into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed
to Iraq.  However, the Clinton Administration decided that the opposition was not
sufficiently capable to merit weapons or combat training. 
Post-September 11, 2001: 
Regime Change and War 
Several senior Bush Administration officials had long been strong advocates of
a regime change policy toward Iraq, but the difficulty of that strategy remained,14 and
the Bush Administration initially continued its predecessor’s emphasis on
containment.  Some accounts say that the Administration was planning, prior to
September 11, to confront Iraq militarily, but President Bush has denied this.  During
its first year, Administration  policy focused on strengthening containment of Iraq,
which the Administration said was rapidly eroding.  The cornerstone of the effort was
achieving U.N. Security Council adoption (Resolution 1409, May 14, 2002) of a
“smart sanctions” plan — relaxing U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to Iraq of
purely civilian equipment15 in exchange for improved international enforcement of
the U.N. ban on exports to Iraq of militarily-useful goods.  
Policy Shift During 2001-2002
Bush Administration  policy on Iraq changed to an active regime change effort
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  In  President Bush’s State of the
Union message on January 29, 2002,  given as the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down, he characterized Iraq as part of an “axis
of evil” (with Iran and North Korea).  Some U.S. officials, particularly deputy
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States needed to respond to
the September 11, 2001 attacks by “ending states,” such as Iraq, that support terrorist
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groups.  Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in March 2002 reportedly to
consult regional countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq militarily,
although the leaders visited reportedly urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli
dispute and opposed war with Iraq.  Some accounts, including the book Plan of
Attack by Bob Woodward (published in April 2004), say that then Secretary of State
Powell and others were concerned about the potential  consequences of an invasion
of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building a democracy after major hostilities
ended.  Other accounts include reported memoranda (the “Downing Street Memo”)
by British intelligence officials, based on conversations with U.S. officials.  That
memo reportedly said that by mid-2002 the Administration had already decided to
go to war against Iraq and that it sought to develop information about Iraq to support
that judgment.  President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this.  (On
December 20, 2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s
refusal to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.)
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for  the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent.  The basis of that assertion in U.S.
intelligence remains under debate. 
! WMD Threat Perception.  Senior U.S. officials, including President
Bush, particularly in an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, asserted
the following about Iraq’s WMD:  (1) that Iraq had worked to
rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
previous resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of
Iraq’s WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons
against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors
(Iran), implying that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from
using WMD against the United States; and (3) that Iraq could
transfer its WMD to terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in
potentially catastrophic  attacks in the United States.  Critics noted
that, under the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD
against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war.  A “comprehensive”
September 2004 report of the Iraq Survey Group, known as the
“Duelfer report,”16 found no WMD stockpiles or production but said
that there was evidence that the regime retained the intention to
reconstitute WMD programs in the future.  The U.S.-led WMD
search ended December 2004.17  The UNMOVIC search remains
technical ly act ive.1 8  See [ht tp: / /www.cia .gov/cia/
reports/iraq_wmd_2004/].
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! Links to Al Qaeda.  Iraq was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-1982 and was again so designated after its 1990
invasion of Kuwait.  Although they did not assert that Saddam
Hussein’s regime had a direct connection to the September 11
attacks, senior U.S. officials asserted that Saddam’s regime was
linked to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-Al Qaeda
militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq.  Although
this issue is still debated, the report of the 9/11 Commission  found
no evidence of a “collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq
and Al Qaeda.19 
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Although it is not certain when the Administration decided on an invasion, in
mid-2002 the Administration began ordering a force to the region that, by early 2003,
gave the President that option.  In concert, the Administration tried to build up and
broaden the Iraqi opposition and, according to the Washington Post (June 16, 2002),
authorizing stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special operations forces to
destabilize Saddam Hussein.  In August 2002, the State and Defense Departments
jointly invited six major  opposition groups to Washington, D.C.  At the same time,
the Administration expanded  its ties to several groups, particularly those composed
of ex-military officers.  The Administration also began training about 5,000
oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,20 although only about 70 completed training at
an air base (Taszar) in Hungary.21  They served mostly as translators during the war.
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly argued was needed — President Bush urged the
United Nations General Assembly (September 12, 2002)  that the U.N. Security
Council should enforce its 16 existing WMD-related resolutions on Iraq.  The
Administration  subsequently agreed to give Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with
all applicable Council resolutions by supporting  Security Council Resolution 1441
(November 8, 2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection.
Iraq reluctantly accepted it.  In January and February 2003, UNMOVIC Director
Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-
Baradei  briefed the Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November
27, 2002.  Although they were not denied access to suspect sites, they  criticized Iraq
for failing to actively cooperate to clear up outstanding questions, but also noted
progress and said that Iraq might not have retained any WMD.  The Bush
Administration asserted that Iraq was not complying with Resolution 1441 because
it was not pro-actively revealing  information.  
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During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion.  It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if
he determines that doing so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N.
Security Council resolutions.  It passed the House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and
the Senate the following day (77-23).  It was signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely.  The United States, along with Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria, maintained that Iraq had not fundamentally decided to disarm.
At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain, Spain, and
Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted  that diplomatic options to disarm
Iraq had failed.  The following evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and
his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003. 
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British-led 30-country22 “coalition of the
willing” force assembled, a substantial proportion of which remained afloat or in
supporting roles.  Of the invasion force, Britain contributed 45,000, and U.S. troops
constituted the bulk of the remaining 335,000 forces.  Some Iraqi units and irregulars
(“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional tactics.
Some post-major combat evaluation  (“Cobra Two,” by Michael Gordon and Bernard
Trainor, published in 2006) suggest the U.S. military should have focused more on
combating the irregulars rather than bypassing them to take on armored forces.  No
WMD was used by Iraq, although it did fire some ballistic missiles into Kuwait; it
is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than 150 km).
The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam Hussein appeared
with supporters that day in Baghdad’s largely Sunni Adhamiya district. 
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition
According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the U.S. goal now
is to enable Iraq to provide for its own security and  not serve as a host for radical
Islamic terrorists.  The Administration believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will
still, as originally envisioned, become a model for reform throughout the Middle
East.  The political transition in post-Saddam Iraq has advanced, but insurgent
violence is still widespread, and sectarian violence has increased to the point that
senior U.S. officials say that such violence is now the pre-eminent security threat in
Iraq, with “potential” for full fledged civil war.  
Occupation Period, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and
Ambassador Paul Bremer.  After the fall of the regime,  the United States set up
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an occupation structure, reportedly grounded in Administration concerns that
immediate sovereignty would favor major factions and not produce democracy.  The
Administration earlier blocked a move by the major factions to declare a provisional
government before the invasion.  The Administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay
Garner  (ret.) to direct reconstruction with a staff of U.S. government personnel to
administer Iraq’s ministries; they deployed in April 2003.  He headed the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the Department of
Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order.  The Administration’s
immediate post-war policy did not make use of an extensive State Department
initiative, called the “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent at least a year before the war
drawing up plans for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam.  Some Iraqis who
participated are now in Iraqi government positions.  The State Department project,
which cost $5 million, had 15 working groups on major issues.23
Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi regime.  He and
then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (now Ambassador to Iraq) organized a
meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying views and
ethnicities.  A subsequent  meeting of over 250 notables was  held  in Baghdad
(April 26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to
name an interim administration.  However, senior U.S. officials reportedly  disliked
Garner’s lax approach, including tolerating Iraqis naming themselves as local leaders.
In May 2003, the Administration named ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace
Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which subsumed
ORHA.  The CPA was an occupying authority recognized by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003). 
Bremer suspended Garner’s political transition process and decided instead to
appoint an Iraqi advisory body that would not have sovereignty.  On July 13, 2003,
he named the 25-member “Iraq Governing Council” (IGC), and in September 2003,
the IGC selected a 25-member “cabinet” to run individual ministries, with roughly
the same factional and ethnic balance of the IGC itself (a slight majority of Shiite
Muslims).  Major IGC figures included the leaders of  the major anti-Saddam
factions, but it was perceived in Iraq as an arm of U.S. decision-making.  In the
process of forming this council, some Sunni figures emerged, including  Ghazi al-
Yawar, a Sunni elder (Shammar tribe) and president of a Saudi-based technology
firm.  However, many Sunnis resented the U.S. invasion and opposed the U.S.
presence and the U.S.-backed Iraqi governing bodies.  Adding to Sunni resentment
were some of the CPA’s most controversial decisions, including the decision not to
recall members of the armed forces to serve in a new Iraqi security force, and to
pursue “de-Baathification” — a purge from government of about 30,000 persons who
held any of the four top ranks of the Baath Party.  The IGC also authorized a war
crimes tribunal for Saddam and his associates. 
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Handover of Sovereignty and Transition Roadmap
The Bush Administration initially made the end of  U.S. occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections for a
new government, tasks expected to be completed by late 2005.  However, Ayatollah
Sistani and others agitated for early Iraqi sovereignty and direct elections.  In
November 2003, the United States announced it would return sovereignty to Iraq by
June 30, 2004, and that national elections would be held by the end of 2005. 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).  The CPA decisions were
incorporated into an interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL), which was drafted mostly by the major anti-Saddam factions (signed on
March 8, 2004).24  It provided a roadmap for political transition, as follows: 
! Elections by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat transitional National
Assembly.  A permanent constitution would be drafted by August
15, 2005, and put to a national referendum by October 15, 2005.
National elections for a permanent government, under the new
constitution (if it passed), would be held by December 15, 2005.
The new government would take office by December 31, 2005.  
! Any three provinces could veto the constitution by a two-thirds
majority.  If that happened, a new draft was to be developed and
voted on by October 15, 2006.  In that case, the December 15, 2005,
elections would have been for  another interim National Assembly.
! The Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government.”  They were given powers to contradict or alter the
application of Iraqi law in their provinces, and their peshmerga
militia were allowed to operate. 
! Islam was designated “a source,” but not the primary source, of law,
and  no law could be passed that contradicts such rights as peaceful
assembly; free expression; and the right to strike and demonstrate.
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover.  The TAL did not
directly  address the formation of the interim government that would assume
sovereignty.  Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan to select a national
assembly through nationwide “caucuses.”  After considering other options, such as
the holding of a  traditional assembly,  the United States tapped U.N. envoy Lakhdar
Brahimi to select that government.25  The interim government, dominated by senior
faction leaders,  was named on June 1, 2004 and began work immediately.  The
formal handover ceremony occurred on June 28, 2004, two days before the advertised
June 30 date, partly to confuse insurgents.  There was a ceremonial president (Ghazi
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al-Yawar), and Allawi was Prime Minister, with executive power, heading a cabinet
of  26 ministers.  Six ministers were women, and the ethnicity mix was roughly the
same as in the IGC.  The defense and interior ministries were headed by Sunni Arabs.
U.N. Backing of  New Government/Coalition Military Mandate.  The
Administration asserts that it has consistently sought U.N. and partner country
involvement in Iraq efforts.  Resolution 1483 (May 6, 2003)  recognized the CPA as
an occupying authority, provided for a U.N. special representative to Iraq, and “called
on” governments to contribute forces for stabilization.  Resolution 1500 (August 14,
2003) established  U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).26  The size of
UNAMI in Iraq has increased to a few hundred, headed by former Pakistani diplomat
Ashraf Jahangir Qazi.  In a further attempt to satisfy the requirements of several
major  nations for greater U.N. backing of the coalition military presence, the United
States obtained agreement on Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003), formally
authorizing a “multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.] command.”
Resolution 1546  (June 8, 2004) took U.N. involvement a step further by
endorsing the handover of sovereignty, reaffirming the responsibilities of the interim
government, and spelling out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq.
It also gave the United Nations a major role in helping the interim government
prepare for the two elections in 2005, and it authorized a coalition component force
to protect U.N. personnel and facilities.  The Resolution:
! “authorize[d]” the U.S.-led coalition to secure Iraq, a provision
interpreted as giving the coalition responsibility for securing Iraq.
Iraqi forces are “a principal partner” in the U.S.-led coalition, and
the relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is spelled out in an
annexed exchange of letters between the United States and Iraq.  The
U.S.-led coalition retained the ability to take prisoners.  
! stipulated that the coalition’s mandate would be reviewed “at the
request of the government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of
this resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire
when a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and
that the mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so
requests.”  The Security Council reviewed the mandate in advance
of the June 8, 2005, deadline, and no alterations to it were made.
However, on November 11, 2005, in advance of the termination of
the mandate, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1637
extending the coalition military mandate to December 31, 2006,
unless earlier requested by the Iraqi government.  The mandate is
also to be reviewed on June 15, 2006, and Iraq’s government said in
early June 2006 that it wants the mandate to continue beyond then.
! deferred the issue of the status of foreign forces (Status of Forces
Agreement, SOFA) to an elected Iraqi  government.  No SOFA  has
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been signed to date, and U.S. forces operate in Iraq and use its
facilities under  temporary memoranda of understanding.  Major
facilities include Balad, Tallil, and Al Asad air bases, as well as the
arms depot at Taji; all are being built up, and funding for additional
construction for several of these sites is provided in the conference
report on H.R. 4939, an FY2006 supplemental appropriation.
However, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told journalists in July
2005 that U.S. military lawyers are working with the Iraqis on a
SOFA or other arrangements that would cover U.S. operations in
Iraq for the duration of U.S. involvement there.  (The conference
report on H.R. 4939 also deletes provisions prohibiting the use of
appropriated funds to enter into a basing rights agreement with Iraq.)
! established a 100-seat  “Interim National Council” to serve as an
interim parliament.  The body, selected in August,27 did not have
legislative power but was able to veto government decisions with a
two-thirds majority.  The council held some  televised “hearings,”
including questioning ministers.  Its work ended after the National
Assembly was elected in January 2005. 
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq.  The following were additional
consequences of the sovereignty handover, designed in part to lower the profile of
U.S. influence over post-handover Iraq.
! As of the June 28, 2004, handover, the state of occupation ceased.
Subsequently, a U.S. Ambassador (John Negroponte) established
U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first time since January 1991.
A U.S. embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with
about 1,100 U.S. personnel.28  Negroponte was succeeded in July
2005 by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was previously
Ambassador to Afghanistan and who takes a more activist approach.
In August 2005, Secretary of State Rice named a new State
Department-based chief coordinator for Iraq:  former deputy chief of
mission in post-Saddam Baghdad James Jeffrey.  An FY2005
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-13, provided $592 million of
$658 million requested to construct a new embassy in Baghdad and
to fund embassy operations.  The large new embassy complex, with
21 buildings on 104 acres, is under construction.  The conference
report on an FY2006 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 4939)
provides $1.327 billion for U.S. embassy operations and security. 
! Iraq gained control over its oil revenues and the Development Fund
for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least one year (until June
2005) by the U.N.-mandated International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB).  Iraq also was given responsibility for close-out of
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the “oil-for-food program.”29  Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2004)
ended that program as of November 21, 2003.
! Reconstruction management and advising of Iraq’s ministries were
taken over by the State Department through the U.S. Embassy and
a unit called the “Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office
(IRMO).”  IRMO, headed since June 2005 by Daniel Speckhard, has
about 150 U.S. civilian personnel working out of  four major centers
around Iraq (satellites of the U.S. Embassy) — Hilla, Basra, Kirkuk,
and Mosul, and 15-20 of them report to IRMO.  (These centers,
except for Basra, have now been converted to Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, discussed further below.)  A
separate “Project Contracting Office (PCO),” headed by Brig. Gen.
William McCoy (now under the Persian Gulf division of the Army
Corps of Engineers), funds infrastructure projects such as roads,
power plants, and school renovations.
Governmental and Constitution Votes in 2005
After the handover of sovereignty, the United States and Iraq began focusing on
the three national votes that would be held in 2005.  These votes and resulting
governments are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections,
Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman. 
January 30, 2005, Elections/New Government.  On January 30, 2005,
elections were held for a transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial councils, and
the Kurdish regional assembly.  Sunnis, still resentful of the U.S. invasion, mostly
boycotted, and no major Sunni slates were offered.  This enabled the UIA to win a
slim majority (140 of the 275 seats) and to ally with the Kurds (75 seats) to dominate
the government formed subsequently.  PUK leader Jalal Talabani was named
president; Ibrahim al-Jafari became Prime Minister.  U.S. officials said publicly this
government  was not sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority, even though it had
a Sunni Arab as  Assembly speaker; deputy president; deputy prime minister;
Defense Minister; and five other ministers.  
Permanent  Constitution.  Despite Sunni opposition, the constitution was
approved on October 15, 2005;  Sunni opponents achieved a two-thirds “no” vote in
two provinces but not the three needed to defeat the constitution.  The crux of Sunni
opposition to it is its provision for a weak central government (“federalism”):  it
allows groups of provinces to band together to  form autonomous “regions” with
their own regional governments, internal security forces, and a large role in
controlling revenues from any new energy discoveries.  The Sunnis oppose this
concept because their region, unlike those dominated by the Kurds and the Shiites,
lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues.  
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As part of their efforts to forge a unified political structure, U.S. officials hope
that the constitution will be modified in 2006 to accommodate these Sunni concerns.
Under a last-minute agreement before the October 15 referendum, the new permanent
government is to name another constitutional commission to propose amendments
to the constitution (within four months of its inauguration).  The amendments require
approval by an Assembly majority,  and then would be put to a national referendum
to be held two months later.  However, some observers say that the continued
schisms in the government formed in May 2006 will delay the constitutional
commission from even beginning work until September 2006. 
December 15, 2005, Election.  In this election, some anti-U.S. Sunnis
moved further into the political arena, including those who offered a broad slate
(“The Concord Front”).  Another Sunni slate was the Iraqi Front for National
Dialogue, headed by constitution negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak.  The vote was  mostly
peaceful.  Final results were released in January 2006, and the results were court-
certified on February 10, formally setting in motion the process of forming a
government. 
The convening of the “Council of Representatives” was  delayed until March
16 by wrangling over governmental positions, most notably the post of Prime
Minister.  The UIA, by a narrow internal vote on February 12, named Jafari to
continue as Prime Minister.  With the UIA alone well short of the two-thirds majority
needed to unilaterally form a government, Jafari came under stiff opposition from
Sunnis, the secular groupings, and the Kurds.  In mid-April, Jafari stepped aside, and
his top Da’wa aide, Nuri al-Maliki, was named Prime Minister designate by the
Council on April 22.  Talabani was selected to continue as president, with two
deputies Adel Abd al-Mahdi of SCIRI and Tariq al-Hashimi of the Concord Front.
A Council leadership team was selected as well, with Mahmoud Mashadani as
speaker (Sunni, Iraqi Front for National Dialogue).  
Maliki had until May 21 to name a cabinet and achieve its confirmation.  Amid
U.S. and other congratulations, Maliki named and won approval of a 39-member
cabinet (including deputy prime ministers) on May 20, one day prior to his 30-day
deadline.  Among his permanent selections were Kurdish official Barham Salih and
Sunni Arab Salam al-Zubaie as deputy prime ministers, and four ministers are
women.  Of the 34 permanent ministerial posts named, a total of seven are Sunnis;
seven are Kurds; nineteen are Shiites; and one is Christian.  Ayatollah Sistani loyalist
Hussein Shahristani was named Oil Minister, even though he has no evident oil
background; controversial SCIRI official Bayan Jabr moved  to Finance Minister
(from Interior); and KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari remains as Foreign Minister.  Sadr
loyalists were named to the ministries of agriculture, health, and transportation.  All
factions have agreed to form an over-arching council on security and economic
matters, in which all factions would be represented, although the President and Prime
Minister would still have the authority to override the council’s decisions.  The
council is not provided for in the new constitution.
Maliki did not immediately name permanent figures for the major posts of
Interior, Defense, and Ministry of State for National Security because major factions
could not agree on nominees.  After several weeks of negotiation, on June 8, 2006
he achieved Council of Representatives confirmation of three compromise
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candidates.  The Defense Minister is Gen. Abdul Qadir Mohammad Jasim al-Mifarji,
a Sunni who had been expelled from the Iraqi military and the Baath Party for
criticizing Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990.  More recently, he
commanded operations of the post-Saddam Iraqi Army in western Iraq.  The new
Interior Minister is Jawad al-Bulani.  He is a Shiite from the UIA bloc but is an
engineer by training and not closely affiliated with any of the major UIA component
factions.  The choice for Minister for National Security is Sherwan al-Waili, a Shiite
who is from a faction of the Da’wa Party not connected to the Da’wa of Maliki or
Jafari.  He has served in post-Saddam Iraq as head of the provincial council in the
city of Nassiriyah, as well as an adviser in the national security ministry.  
Table 2.  Major Sunni Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq
Ghazi al-Yawar 
(Iraqis Party)
Yawar has cooperated with the U.S. since the invasion,
serving as President in the Allawi government and
deputy president in the post-January 2005 government.  
Iraqi Concord Front 
(Tariq al-Hashimi and
Adnan al-Dulaymi)
The Front is led by Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), headed by
Tariq al-Hashimi.  IIP withdrew from the  in January
2005 election but led this Sunni coalition to compete in
December 2005 elections.  Critical of but accepts U.S.
presence.  Includes Iraqi General People’s Council of
Adnan al-Dulaymi and the Sunni Endowment.  The
Front holds 44 seats in new parliament.  Hashimi named
a deputy president on April 22.  
Iraqi Front for National
Dialogue 
(Saleh al-Mutlak)
Mutlak, an ex-Baathist, was chief negotiator for Sunnis
on the new constitution, but was dissatisfied with the
outcome and now advocates major revisions to the new
constitution.  Holds 11 seats in the new parliament. 






Hardline Sunni Islamist, has boycotted all post-Saddam
elections.  Believed to have ties to and influence over
insurgent factions.  Wants timetable for U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq. 
Iraqi Insurgents Numerous factions and no unified leadership, although a
multi-group “Mujahedin Shura” was formed in early
2006, led by an Iraqi (Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi). 
Some groups led by ex-Saddam regime leaders, others
by Islamic extremists.  Major factions outside mujahedin
shura include Islamic Army of Iraq, Muhammad’s Army,
and the 1920 Revolution Brigades. 
Foreign Fighters/
Zarqawi Faction
Estimated 3,000 in Iraq.  Have been led by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian national, killed in a U.S.
airstrike on June 7, 2006.  His faction, whose leadership
is now unclear, is part of new Mujahedin Shura.
Advocates attacks on Iraqi Shiite civilians to spark civil
war.  Related foreign fighter faction, which includes
some Iraqis, is Ansar al-Sunna, but this group is not in
the Mujahedin Shura. 
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The elected Iraqi government received some diplomatic support, even though
most of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination of the
regime.  As of mid-2006, there are 46 foreign missions in Iraq, including most
European and Arab countries.  Jordan has appointed an ambassador and Kuwait has
pledged to do so, but these and other diplomatic upgrades have been largely on hold
since attacks on diplomats from Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco in 2005.  Iran
upgraded its representation to Ambassador in May 2006.  At an Arab League meeting
in late March 2006,  Arab states pledged to increase their diplomatic representation
in Iraq, and to consider other help (aid, debt relief) to bolster the Iraqi government.
Democracy-Building and Local Governance/FY2006 Supplemental.
The United States and its coalition partners have tried to build civil society and
democracy at the local level.  U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the
past 30 years, with a free press and the ability to organize politically.  A State
Department report to Congress in April 2006 detailed how the FY2004 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 108-106) “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund” (IRRF) is being
spent (“2207 Report”):
! About  $1.014  billion is allocated for “Democracy Building.”  
! About $71 million is allocated for related “Rule of Law” programs.
! About $159 million is allocated to build and secure courts and train
legal personnel.
! About $128 million is allocated for “Investigations of Crimes
Against Humanity,” primarily former regime abuses. 
! $10 million is for U.S. Institute of Peace democracy/civil society/
conflict resolution activities. 
! $10 million is for the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (which is
evaluating Kurdish claims to property taken from Kurds, mainly in
Kirkuk, during Saddam’s regime).
! $15 million is to promote human rights and human rights education
centers.  
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), some of the democracy and rule of
law building activities conducted with these funds, aside from assistance for the
various elections in Iraq in 2005, include the following:
! Several projects that attempt to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
! Activities to empower local governments, policies that are receiving
increasing U.S. attention and additional funding allocations from the
IRRF.  These programs include (1) the “Community Action
Program” (CAP) through which local reconstruction projects are
voted on by village and town representatives.  About 1,800
community associations have been established thus far; (2)
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Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs) to
empower local governments to decide on reconstruction priorities;
and (3) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are local
enclaves to provide secure conditions for reconstruction, as
discussed further later in this paper.  The conference report on an
FY2006 supplemental appropriation, H.R. 4939, designates $50
million in  ESF for Iraq to be used to keep the CAP operating.  The
House-passed version of an FY2007 foreign aid appropriation, H.R.
5522, earmarks another $50 million in ESF for the CAP. 
! Programs to empower women and promote their involvement in
Iraqi politics, as well as programs to promote independent media. 
! Some funds have been used for easing tensions in cities that have
seen substantial U.S.-led anti-insurgency combat, including Fallujah,
Ramadi, Sadr City district of Baghdad, and Mosul.
In addition to what is already allocated, the FY2006 regular foreign aid
appropriations (conference report H.Rept. 109-265 on P.L. 109-102)  provides $56
million in FY2006 funds for democracy promotion.  It incorporated a Senate
amendment (S.Amdt. 1299, Kennedy) to that legislation providing $28 million each
to the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for
democracy promotion in Iraq.  The FY2006 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 4939)
provides $50 million in ESF for Iraq democracy  promotion, allocated to various
organizations performing democracy work there (U.S. Institute of Peace, National
Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, National Endowment for
Democracy, and others).  
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance30
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, although some aspects of that effort appear to be faltering.  As discussed
in recent reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR),
the difficult security environment has slowed reconstruction, particularly in the
restive areas of Iraq.  Since September 2004, the U.S. reconstruction process has
shifted resources to smaller scale projects that could be completed quickly and
employ Iraqis, such as sewer lines and city roads.  
The primary vehicle for reconstruction funding is the IRRF.  Total funds of
$20.912 billion for the IRRF came from two supplemental appropriations  (FY2003
supplemental, P.L. 108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion; and the FY2004
supplemental appropriations, P.L. 108-106, which provided about $18.44 billion).
Of those funds, $18.964  billion has been obligated, and, of that, $14.495 billion has
been disbursed as of June 6, 2006.  Other reconstruction funds have been
appropriated ($1.3 billion total for the Commanders Emergency Response Fund, $5.7
billion in FY2005 for Iraqi security forces, and other much smaller appropriations)
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but are not included in the IRRF.  According to State Department reports, the sector
allocations for the IRRF are as follows:
! $5.036 billion for Security and Law Enforcement;
! $1.315 billion for Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society;
! $1.033 billion for Democracy;
! $4.22 billion for Electricity Sector;
! $1.735 billion for Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.131 billion for Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $465.5 million for Transportation and Communications;
! $333.7 million for Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $739 million for Health Care;
! $805 million for Private Sector Development (includes $352 million
for debt relief for Iraq);
! $410 million for Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy,
and Governance  (includes $99 million for education); and
! $213 million for USAID administrative expenses.
FY2006 Supplemental and FY2007.  To continue reconstruction, the
Administration requested FY2006 supplemental funds of $1.6 billion and $479
million for FY2007, mainly to help sustain infrastructure already built with U.S.
funds.  The conference report on H.R. 4939 (FY2006 supplemental) provides 1.485
billion.  The House-passed  FY2007 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 5522) provides
$305.8 million in ESF for Iraq reconstruction.  
Oil Industry.  The oil industry is the driver of Iraq’s economy, and rebuilding
this industry has received substantial U.S. attention.  Before the war, it was widely
asserted by Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only
to those of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction costs.  The oil
industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led invasion (only about
nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of insurgents.  They have
focused their attacks on pipelines in northern Iraq that feed the Iraq-Turkey oil
pipeline that is loaded at Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.  (Iraq’s total
pipeline system is over 4,300 miles long.)  The attacks, coupled with corruption and
other deterioration, has kept production and exports below expected levels, although
high world oil prices have been, at least until now,  more than compensating for the
output shortfall.  The northern export route has been shut since early 2006 but might
now be coming back into operation at levels of about 100,000 barrels per day.  The
United States imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude oil from Iraq.  The Iraqi
government needs to import refined gasoline because it lacks sufficient refining
capacity.  Lines for gasoline often last many hours.  
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day) National Average (hrs. per day)
102,000 100,000 8.4 11.3
Other Economic Indicators
GDP Growth Rate (2006 anticipated by IMF) 10.6%
GDP $18.9 billion (2002) $33.1 billion (2005)
New Businesses Begun Since 2003 30,000
Note: Figures in the table are provided by the State Department “Iraq Weekly Status Report” dated
May 31, 2006.  Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the 1990
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483
(May 22, 2003).  That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves.  Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.  Iraq’s interim government has contracted for a study of the extent of Iraq’s
oil reserves, and it has contracted with Royal Dutch/Shell to formulate a blueprint to
develop the gas sector.  Poland reportedly is negotiating with Iraq for possible
investments in Iraq’s energy sector.  In December 2005, it was reported that a
Norwegian company, DNO, has contracted with the Kurdish administrative region
to explore for oil near the northern city of Zakho, raising the concerns of Iraq’s Arabs
who view this as a move by the Kurds to control some Iraqi oil revenues.  The
company says the field might eventually produce about 100,000 barrels per day.  
International Donors.  A World Bank estimate, released in October 2003,
said Iraq reconstruction would require about  $56 billion during 2004-2007, including
$21 billion in U.S. pledges.  At an October 2003 donors’ conference in Madrid,
donors pledged about $13.5 billion, including $8 billion from foreign governments
and $5.5 billion in loans from the World Bank and IMF.  Of the funds pledged by
other foreign governments, about $3.5 billion has been disbursed as of December
2005, according to the April 2006 “2207 Report.”  Included in that figure is about
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$436 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, which were disbursed in
2004 after Iraq cleared up $81 million in Saddam-era arrears to the IMF.  
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction/CERP Funds.  The U.S. military
has attempted to promote reconstruction to deprive the insurgency of popular
support.  A key tool in this effort is the funding of small projects to garner Iraqi
public support.  Called the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), the
DOD funds are controlled and disbursed by U.S. commanders at the tactical level.
The total amount of CERP funds for Iraq made available thus far are $1.3 billion,
according to the State Department, including FY2004, 2005, and 2006 funds.  A
similar program began in October 2004, called the Commander’s Humanitarian
Relief and Reconstruction Projects (CHHRP).  About $86 million in has been
allocated for this program, mostly for water and sewage in Sunni areas.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions.  The Bush Administration has lifted most U.S.
sanctions on Iraq, beginning with Presidential Determinations issued under
authorities provided by P.L. 108-7 (appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11
(FY2003 supplemental):
! On July 30, 2004,  President Bush issued an executive order ending
a trade and investment ban imposed on Iraq by Executive Order
12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), and reinforced
by the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513,
November 5, 1990 (following the August 2, 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.)  The order did not unblock Iraqi assets frozen at that time.
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to be imported to the United States duty-free.  
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72).  Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of arms and related equipment and services.
Exports of dual use items (items that can have military applications)
are no longer subject to strict licensing procedures.31 
! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) removed Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold a proportionate share of its voluntary contributions to
international organizations for programs in those countries.  
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Debt Relief/WTO Membership.  The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt,  built up during Saddam’s regime, and
estimated  of Saddam Hussein.  The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not
including reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war.  In 2004, the “Paris Club”
of 19 industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes
them.  However, with the exception of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf states that supported
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have not to date firmly agreed to write-off Iraq’s
approximately $50 billion in debt to those countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and Qatar).  On December 17, 2004, the United States signed an
agreement with Iraq writing off 100% of Iraq’s $4.1 billion debt to the United States;
that debt consisted of  principal and interest from about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi
agricultural credits from the 1980s.32  On December 13, 2004, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession talks with Iraq.  
Security Challenges, 
Responses, and Options
In several speeches on Iraq since late 2005, President Bush cited successful
elections and the growth of the Iraqi security forces to assert that U.S. policy will
produce a stable Iraq, while acknowledging many of the unexpected security and
political difficulties encountered.  Congress has mandated two major periodic
Administration reports on progress in stabilizing Iraq.  A Defense Department
quarterly report, which DOD has titled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,”
was required by an FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13).  The latest
version was issued in May 2006 and provides some of the information below.
Another  report, first issued April 6, 2006 (“1227 Report”), was required by Section
1227 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163).  
The Insurgent Challenge
 The  Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. and Iraqi forces has defied most
U.S. expectations in  intensity and duration.  Although hesitant to assess the size of
the insurgency, U.S. commanders say that insurgents probably number approximately
12,000-20,000.  Some Iraqi (intelligence) officials have publicly advanced higher
estimates of about 40,000 active insurgents, helped by another 150,000 persons in
supporting roles.  Insurgent attacks — characterized mostly by roadside bombs,
mortar and other indirect fire, and direct weapons fire as well as larger suicide
bombings —  numbered about 100 per day during most of 2005, and the DOD report
cited above now puts that number at about 90 attacks per day, a figure including both
insurgent and sectarian-related attacks. 
As discussed in the Administration’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq”
(November 30, 2005), many of the insurgents are motivated by opposition to
perceived U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite political dominance.  Others
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want to bring the Baath Party back into power, although, according to many experts,
some would settle for a larger Sunni role in governance without the Baath.  Still
others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters, either foreign or Iraqi, that want to defeat the
United States and spread radical Islam throughout the region.  The insurgent groups
are believed to be loosely coordinated within cities and wider provinces.  However,
in early 2006, a group of five insurgent factions announced the formation of a
national  “Mujahedin Shura (Council)” led by an Iraqi, Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi.
This grouping purportedly consists mostly of Iraqi factions but includes foreign
fighters who have been led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who died in a June 7, 2006,
U.S. airstrike.
 Despite their growing coordination,  the insurgents  have failed to derail the
political transition,33 although they have succeeded, to some extent, in painting the
Iraqi government as ineffective.  Since March 2006, insurgent groups have conducted
several large-scale (50 insurgents fighters or more) attacks on police stations and
other fixed positions, in at least one case overrunning a station and freeing prisoners
from it.  Other targets include not only U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security
forces but also Iraqi civilians working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors and
aid workers, oil export and gasoline distribution facilities, and water, power, and
other infrastructure facilities.  The U.N. Security Council has adopted the U.S.
interpretation of the insurgency — on August 4, 2005, it adopted Resolution 1618,
condemning the “terrorist attacks that have taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on
Iraqi election workers, constitution drafters, and foreign diplomats in Iraq.  The
conference report on the FY2006 supplemental (H.R. 4939) provides  $1.3 million
in Treasury Department funds to disrupt insurgent financing. 
Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi Faction.34  A numerically small but
politically significant component of  the insurgency  is  non-Iraqi.  A study by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies released in September 2005 said that
about 3,500 foreign fighters are in Iraq.  According to the study, the foreign fighters
come mostly from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, with
Saudis constituting only about 350 of the 3,000 estimated foreign fighters.  The
Department of Defense said on October 20, 2005, that 312 foreign fighters had been
captured in Iraq since April 2005.  
 A major portion of the foreign fighters has been commanded by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, a 40-year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in Afghanistan during
the 1980s alongside other Arab volunteers against the Soviet Union.  He was killed
in a June 7, 2006, U.S. airstrike and has been succeeded by the little known Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir (also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri), an Egyptian national.
Zarqawi came to Iraq in late 2001, along with several hundred associates,  after
escaping the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan.  He made his way to northern Iraq, after
transiting Iran and Saddam-controlled Iraq, eventually taking refuge with a Kurdish
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39 Blanford, Nicholas.  “Sealing Syria’s Desolate Border,” Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
21, 2004. 
Islamist faction called Ansar al-Islam35 near the town of Khurmal.36  After the Ansar
enclave was destroyed in OIF, Zarqawi went  to the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, naming
his faction the Association of Unity and Jihad.  He then formally affiliated with Al
Qaeda (through a reputed exchange of letters) and changed his faction’s name to “Al
Qaeda Jihad in Mesopotamia.”  It is named as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO), assuming that designation from the earlier Unity and Jihad title,37 which was
designated as an FTO in October 2004. 
The foreign fighters have been a U.S. focus because of their alleged perpetration
of large-scale suicide and other bombings against both combatant and civilian targets.
These include the bombings in Baghdad of  U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel
(August 19, 2003)38 and the August 2003 bombing that killed SCIRI leader
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim.  The group, and related factions,  have also kidnaped
a total of over 250 foreigner workers, and killed about 40 of those.  In an effort to
stoke Sunni — Shiite civil war in Iraq, Zarqawi’s group apparently was responsible
for the February 22 attack on the Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra that has sparked
significant sectarian violence.  However, Zarqawi’s position on Shiite civilian attacks
caused tensions and occasional armed clashes with Iraqi insurgent factions that
oppose attacks on purely civilian targets.  Zarqawi’s successors issued a purported
statement on June 13, 2006, that he would continue to emphasize  attacks on Shiite
civilians.  It is also unclear whether Zarqawi’s faction, after his death, will attempt
to spread outside Iraq.  Zarqawi’s faction reputedly committed the August 19, 2005,
failed rocket attack in the Jordanian port of Aqaba against two U.S. warships docked
there, as well as the November 10, 2005, bombing of  Western-owned hotels in
Amman, Jordan.
Outside Support.  Numerous accounts have said that insurgent leaders are
using Syria as a base to funnel money and weapons to their fighters in Iraq.39  Others
believe that outside support for the insurgency is not decisive.  According to this
view, the insurgents have ample supplies of arms and explosives obtained from the
nearly 250,000 tons of munitions remaining around Iraq in arms depots not
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immediately secured after the regime fell.  In September 2005, U.S. ambassador
Khalilzad publicly accused Syria of allowing training camps in Syria for Iraqi
insurgents to gather and train before going into Iraq.  These reports led to U.S.
warnings to and imposition of additional U.S. sanctions against Syria and to the U.S.
Treasury Department’s blocking of assets of some suspected financiers of the
insurgency.  Syria tried to deflect the criticism by moves such as the February 2005
turnover of Saddam Hussein’s half-brother Sabawi to Iraqi authorities.  Since January
2006, senior U.S. commanders in Iraq have said they have been receiving increased
cooperation from Syria to prevent insurgent flows across those borders.  Other
assessments say the insurgents, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive funding from
wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia,40 where a number of
clerics have publicly called on Saudis to support the Iraqi insurgency.  Some reports
say that some influential Saudis want the Saudi government to provide direct support
to Sunni insurgents in Iraq as a means of protecting the Sunni minority, although the
government apparently is resisting doing so on the grounds that militants might
return to Saudi Arabia to commit violence.  
 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace
asserted on March 7, 2006 that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is assisting armed
factions in Iraq with explosives and weapons.  However, the most likely recipient is
the Shiite faction of Moqtada al-Sadr, rather than Sunni insurgents that are at odds
with Iran’s allies in Iraq.  Because of Iran’s support for Shiite militias, the United
States and Iran confirmed in March 2006 that they would conduct direct talks on the
issue of stabilizing Iraq, and U.S. officials say such talks would not expand to include
bilateral U.S.-Iran issues such as Iran’s nuclear program.  Iran subsequently said the
talks are not needed because Iraq has a new government, and no talks have been held,
to date.  For more information, see CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq,
by Kenneth Katzman.
Sectarian Violence/Militias/Civil War?
The security environment  in Iraq has become more complex over the past year
as sectarian violence has increased.  Sunni Arabs are increasingly fighting Shiite
Arabs and vice versa, in addition to fighting U.S. and Iraqi government forces.
Baghdad morgue officials said in May 2006 that about 40 victims of sectarian
violence arrive daily at the central morgue usually bound and gagged, but often
dumped in rivers, facilities, vehicles, or fields.  Top U.S. officials  have said recently
that sectarian-motivated violence has now displaced the insurgency as the primary
security challenge in Iraq.  U.S. officials, both military and civilian, have said the
sectarian violence risks becoming all-out civil war, but that they do not consider Iraq
in a civil war now.  
The sectarian violence is difficult to curb because the Sunnis are blaming the
Shiites and Kurds for using their control over the emerging security forces — as well
as their party-based militias — to retaliate and repress Sunnis.  Sunnis report that
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Shiite militiamen who have joined the security forces are raiding Sunni homes or
using their arrest powers to abduct Sunnis, some of whom later show up killed.
Sunnis hold U.S. forces partly responsible for the violence because U.S. forces built
the Iraqi security forces and have allowed the Shiite and Kurdish militias to continue
to operate. 
The violence worsened after the February 22, 2006, bombing of the Askariya
Shiite mosque in Samarra.  The destruction of its dome set off a wave of purported
Shiite militia attacks on about 60 Sunni mosques and the killing of about 400 persons
in the first days after the sectarian attacks.  Some accounts say that well over 4,000
Iraqis have been killed in sectarian violence since then, with about 1,400 killed
during May 2006 alone.  Officials from the International Organization of Migration
(IOM) said in June 2006 that there are now about 85,000 internally displaced persons
in Iraq (Iraqis who are fleeing their homes in mixed Baghdad neighborhoods (Shula,
for example) or provinces because of threats from one sect or the other.41  To counter
the Shiite-led violence, in February 2006, Sunni Arabs are forming militias, such as
the Anbar Revolutionaries, to guard against Shiite and Kurdish sectarian attacks.
Other Iraqis are setting up neighborhood watch squads and impromptu checkpoints
to prevent purported security forces or strangers from entering their neighborhoods.
The sectarian violence has caused U.S. officials to assert that the new
government must not only better vet their new security forces but also control or
dismantle the eleven independent militias identified by Iraqi officials.  Although U.S.
commanders have, to date, mostly tolerated the presence of militias, there are
indications that U.S. forces are moving to curb them, with or without direct Iraqi
government assistance.  In one example, U.S. and Iraqi forces killed about 16
purported Mahdi fighters at a site in Baghdad on March 26, 2006, although Iraq’s
Shiite politicians say the site was a mosque and those present there were unarmed.
U.S. forces are also moving to prevent security forces personnel from engaging in
sectarian violence, as discussed later.  The three major militias are discussed below.
! Kurdish Peshmerga.  Together, the KDP and PUK may have as
many as 100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of whom are
operating as unofficial security organs in northern Iraqi cities.  Some
are integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and deploy in such
cities as Mosul and  Baghdad.  Kurdish ISF units reportedly were a
major component of the ISF  forces that fought alongside U.S. forces
in offensives at Tal Affar in September 2005.  Peshmerga units have
sometimes fought each other; in May 1994, the KDP and the PUK
clashed with each other over territory, customs revenues, and control
over the Kurdish regional government in Irbil. 
! Badr Brigades.  The militia of  SCIRI  numbers about 5,000 and is
led by Hadi al-Amiri  (a member of  parliament).  The Badr Brigades
were recruited, trained, and equipped by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,
aligned with Iran’s  hardliners, during the Iran-Iraq war, during
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which Badr guerrillas conducted forays from Iran into southern Iraq
to attack Baath Party officials.  Most Badr fighters were recruited
from the ranks of Iraqi prisoners of war held in Iran.  However,
many Iraqi Shiites viewed SCIRI as an Iranian puppet and Badr
operations in southern Iraq during the 1980s and 1990s did not shake
Saddam’s grip on power.  The Badr “Organization” registered as a
separate political entity, in addition to its SCIRI parent, for the
elections in 2005.  
! Badr militiamen play unofficial policing roles in Basra, Najaf, and
elsewhere in southern Iraq, and many Badr members also reputedly
are in the ISF, particularly the police, which is led by the SCIRI-
dominated Interior Ministry.  A related militia, called the “Wolf
Brigade” (now renamed the Freedom Brigade) is a Badr offshoot
that is formally part of the police.  It is also led by a SCIRI activist.
Sunni charges of Badr “death squads” activities first gained strength
on November 16, 2005, with the discovery by U.S. forces of a secret
Ministry of Interior detention facility.  The facility, allegedly run by
Badr militiamen, housed 170 Sunni Arab detainees who allegedly
were tortured.  At least two other such facilities, run by the Wolf
Brigade, were uncovered in December 2005.  In another example of
militia strength, on August 9, 2005, Badr fighters reportedly helped
SCIRI member Hussein al-Tahaan forcibly replace Ali al-Tamimi as
mayor of Baghdad.
! Mahdi Army.  U.S. officials say Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia has now
grown to about 20,000 fighters, representing a regaining of its
strength since U.S. military operations put down Mahdi  uprisings
in April and August of  2004 in Sadr City.  In those cases, fighting
was ended with compromises under which Mahdi forces stopped
fighting (and in some cases traded in some of their weapons for
money) in exchange for lenient treatment or releases of prisoners,
amnesty for Sadr himself, and reconstruction aid.  The Mahdi Army
has since ended active  anti-U.S. combat and Sadr City has been
relatively peaceful, but Mahdi fighters, reportedly with the tacit
approval of U.S. forces, continued to patrol that district and parts of
other Shiite cities, particularly Basra.  Mahdi  assertiveness in Basra
 — coupled with the allied Fadilah party’s attempts to counter
SCIRI and control the Basra provincial government — has  partly
accounted for a sharp deterioration of relations since July 2005
between Iraqi officials in Basra and the British forces based there.
About 20 British soldiers have died in attacks in that area since then,
including a British helicopter shot down in May 2006.  In one
dispute in 2005, British forces forcibly rescued British special forces
soldiers taken into official custody in Basra. 
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U.S. Efforts to Restore Security
At times, such as after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 and
after all three elections in 2005, U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the
insurgency would subside, only to see it continue.  As outlined in the “National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the Administration continues to try to refine its
stabilization strategy. 
“Clear, Hold, and Build”Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
The Administration is now pursuing a strategy called “clear, hold, and build,”
intended to create and expand stable enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces and U.S.
civilian reconstruction experts in areas cleared of insurgents.  The strategy, based
partly on an idea advanced by Andrew Krepinevich in the September/October 2005
issue of Foreign Affairs,42 says that the United States should devote substantial
resources to preventing insurgent re-infiltration and promoting reconstruction in
selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that would attract support and be
expanded to other areas and eventually throughout Iraq.  In conjunction with the new
U.S. strategy,  the Administration is forming Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), a concept used in Afghanistan.  Each PRT is  civilian led, composed of about
100 U.S. State Department officials and contract personnel, to assist local Iraqi
governing institutions, such as the provincial councils (elected in the January 2005
elections), representatives of the Iraqi provincial governors, and local ministry
representatives.  As reported in the Washington Post on January 15, 2006, the
concept ran into some reported difficulty over U.S. military objections to taking on
expanded missions at a time when it is trying to draw down its force.  The internal
debate has apparently been resolved with an agreement by DOD to provide security
to the U.S.-run PRTs.  
Thus far, five  PRTs have been inaugurated:  in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Baghdad,
and Anbar Province.  Plans are for three more U.S. led PRTs and four partner-run
PRTs, as well as perhaps eight Iraqi-run PRTs.  To date,  Britain has agreed to
establish a PRT in Basra, and Italy has agreed to form one in Dhi Qar province. 
PRT Funding.  The FY2006 supplemental request asks for $400 million for
operational costs for the PRTs as well as $675 million for development grants to be
distributed by them.  Both versions of H.R. 4939 contain some cuts to the operational
portion of the Administration request for this function.  
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations.  The Administration
position is that continued combat operations against the insurgency are required.
About 132,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq (down from 160,000 there during the
December election period and down from 2005 baseline levels of 138,000), with
about another 50,000 troops  in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf region supporting  OIF.
The prospects for force reductions are discussed in the section on options below.
U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-7, CJTF-7) is
now a multi-national headquarters “Multinational Force-Iraq, MNF-I,” headed by
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four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey.  Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli is operational commander
of U.S. forces as head of the “Multinational Corps-Iraq.”  
A major focus of U.S. counter-insurgent combat remains Anbar Province, which
includes the cities of  Fallujah and Ramadi, the latter of which is the most restive of
all Iraqi cities.  An additional 1,500 U.S. troops were sent to Ramadi in May 2006 to
combat U.S./Iraqi apparent loss of control there.  About 40,000 U.S. troops are in
Anbar alone.  Differing  degrees of combat continue consistently in about two dozen
other Sunni-inhabited towns, including Baqubah, Balad, Tikrit, Mosul, Samarra, Hit,
Haditha, and Tal Affar, as well as several small towns south of Baghdad, such as
Yusufiya.  In  the run-up to the December 15 elections, U.S. (and Iraqi) forces
conducted several major operations (for example Operations Matador, Dagger, Spear,
Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and Ram) to clear contingents of foreign
fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities along the Euphrates River.  A major
focus was to combat foreign fighters  that entered Iraq near the Iraq-Syria border
towns of Qaim, Husaybah, and Ubaydi.  
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in March 2006 that Iraqi forces, not U.S.-
led international forces, would take the lead in trying to suppress any all-out civil
war.  He and others have said they do not believe Iraq is now in a state of civil war.
Casualties.  As of June 14, 2006,  2,499 U.S. forces and about 220  coalition
partner soldiers have died in OIF, as well as over 125 U.S. civilians working on
contract to U.S. institutions in Iraq.  Of  U.S. deaths, 2,345 have occurred since
President Bush declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003,
and about 1,960 of the U.S. deaths were by hostile action.  On December 12, 2005,
President Bush cited press accounts that about 30,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed
to date.  (For more information on Iraqi casualties, see CRS Report RS22441, Iraqi
Civilian, Police, and Security Force Casualty Estimates, by Hannah Fischer.) 
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)43  
A major pillar of  U.S. policy is to equip and train Iraqi security forces (ISF) that
could secure Iraq by themselves.  President Bush stated in his June 28, 2005 speech,
“Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand
down.”44  The most recent DOD “Measuring Stability” report, released May 2006,
generally reiterates U.S. official statements of progress in Iraq and contains details
of efforts to improve the training and performance of the ISF.  
The tables below detail the composition of the ISF and provide Administration
assessments of force readiness.  As of June 14,  there are  265,600 total ISF: 117,400
“operational” military forces under the  Ministry of Defense  and 148,200 police and
police commando forces “trained and equipped” under the Ministry of Interior.  The
total force goal is 325,000 ISF by August 2007.  However, police figures include
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possibly tens of thousands (according to the GAO on March 15, 2005) who are
absent-without-leave or  might have deserted.  The police generally live with their
families, rather than in barracks, and are therefore hard to account for.  
 According to the DOD “Measuring Stability” report, about 50,000 ISF — 71
military battalions and two police battlions — are “in the lead” on operations.  No
battalions are rated as “fully independent.”  U.S. officials and reports praise their
performance in each of the three election days in 2005, and General Casey praised
the ISF’s performance after the February 22 Samarra mosque bombing, although he
did note some police units allowed militia fighters through checkpoints to attack
Sunnis.  U.S. commanders also cite as evidence of their growing confidence the
September 2005 offensive in Tal Afar in which Iraqi units were in the lead,  although
some outside accounts call that assessment into question.  
The U.S.-led Multinational Transition Security Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I),
led by Gen. Martin Dempsey, is making progress preparing ISF units to assume
greater responsibility.  In March 2006, the commander of MNF-I Gen. Peter Chiarelli
said that ISF forces might control 75% of Iraqi territory by the end of 2006. As of
May 2006, U.S. and partner forces have now turned over to the ISF 34 out of 111
foward operation bases, and responsibility for “battle space” in several areas,
including:
! about 90 square miles of Baghdad, including Sadr City, the
International (Green Zone), Haifa Street, and Dora district —
National Police and 6th Iraqi Army Division (IAD);
! the entire provinces of Wasit, Qadissiyah, Nafaf, and Babil — 8th
IAD (mostly Shiites);
! areas south and west of Mosul — 2nd and 3rd IAD, respectively; 
! large parts of restive Salahuddin Province, including Tikrit, and of
Tamim Province, including Kirkuk — 4th IAD (mostly Kurdish);  
! areas west of Baghdad, including Abu Ghraib and the area around
Habbaniyah (the first part of Anbar Province turned over to the ISF)
 — 1st and 6th IAD; 
! Maysan and Muthanna Provinces are expected to be turned over
later in the summer of 2006. 
However, some U.S. commanders and outside observers say that the ISF
continue to lack an effective command structure, independent initiative, or
commitment to the mission, and that it could fragment if U.S. troops draw down.45
U.S. commanders have told journalists recently that it is common for half of an entire
ISF unit to desert or refuse to undertake a specified mission.46  A report on the Iraqi
police by the offices of the Inspector General of the State and Defense Departments,
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released July 15, 2005, said that many recruits are only marginally literate, and some
recruits are actually insurgents trying to infiltrate the ISF (p.3).47  
A major issue is ethnic balance; U.S. commanders have acknowledged difficulty
recruiting Sunni Arabs into the ISF and have said this is a deficiency they are trying
to correct. Most of the ISF, particularly the police, are Shiites, with Kurdish units
mainly deployed in the north.  There are few units of mixed ethnicity, and, as
discussed above, many Sunnis see the ISF as mostly Shiite and Kurdish instruments
of repression and responsible for sectarian killings.  That the new Interior Minister
is not viewed as a hardline Shiite partisan might bring some corrective steps into the
police.  Even before his appointment, some Sunnis had been recruited to rebuild
police forces in Mosul and Fallujah, which virtually collapsed in 2004.  As indicators
of difficulty, in May 2006, new Sunni recruits deserted a graduation ceremony
immediately after learning they would be deployed in Shiite-dominated areas of Iraq.
Later in the month, Shiite and Kurdish ISF units clashed with each other.  In part to
gain greater control particularly over the National Police, the United States and Iraq
announced a plan in May 2006 to consolidate all security forces in Baghdad into one
unified force.  U.S. forces are also instructing residents not to cooperate with police
units unless these forces are accompanied by coalition forces or can otherwise prove
their authenticity.
There are growing allegations that some of the 145,000 members of the
Facilities Protection Force, which is not formally under any ministry, may be
involved in sectarian violence.  The U.S. and Iraq began trying to rein in the force in
May 2006 by placing it under some Ministry of Interior guidance, including issuing
badges and supervising what types of weapons it uses.  
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Table 4.  Ministry of Defense Forces
Force Size/Strength IRRF FundsAllocated
Iraqi Army 116,000 total; goal is 131,000.  Forces in units are
in 104 battalions (about 70,000 personnel), with
71 battalions (about 50,000) able to lead
operations.  57 battalions (about 40,000) control
their own “battle space.”  Trained for eight weeks,
paid $60/month.  Has mostly East bloc equipment,












About 3,000 personnel, included in Army total




About 1,600 divided between Iraqi Counter-
Terrorist Force (ICTF) and a Commando




About 2,900 personnel in seven battalions to
protect oil pipelines, electricity infrastructure.  The




About 1,500.  Recently transferred from Ministry
of Interior control.
Air Force About 600, its target size.  Has 9 helicopters, 3 C-
130s; 14 observation aircraft.  Trained for six
months.  UAE and Jordan to provide other aircraft






Navy About 800, about the target size.  Has a Patrol
Boat Squadron and a Coastal Defense Regiment. 
Fields about 35 patrol boats for anti-smuggling
and anti-infiltration.  Controls naval base at Umm
Qasra, Basra port, and Khor al-Amaya oil




U.S. training, including embedding with Iraqi units, involves about
10,000 U.S. forces,  run by Multinational Security Transition
Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I).  Training at Taji, north of Baghdad;
Kirkush, near Iranian border; and Numaniya, south of Baghdad.  All
26 NATO nations at NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) at
Rustamiyah (300 trainers).  Others trained at NATO bases in Norway
and Italy.  Jordan, Germany, and Egypt also have done training.  
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Table 5.  Ministry of Interior Forces
Force Size/Strength IRRF Funds Allocated
Iraqi Police Service
(IPS)
103,400, including 1,300 person
Highway Patrol.  Target size is
135,000 by 2007.  Gets eight
weeks of training, paid $60 per
month.  Not organized as
battalions. 
$ 1.806 billion allocated
for training and
technical assistance.
Center for  Dignitary
Protection
About 500 personnel
National Police  About 26,000.  Comprises “Police
Commandos,” Public Order
Police,” and “Mechanized Police.” 
Organized into 28 battalions, 2 of
which (about 1,500) are “in the
lead” in counter-insurgency
operations.  Six battalions (about
4,000) control security in their
areas.  Overwhelmingly Shiite, but
U.S. is attempting to recruit more
Sunnis.  Gets four weeks of
counter-insurgency training.  
Emergency Response
Unit
About 300, able to lead
operations.  Hostage rescue.
Border Enforcement
Department
About 18,000.  Controls 258
border forts built or under
construction.  Has Riverine Police
component to secure water
crossings.  
$437 million, $3 million
of which is allocated to
pay stipends to 150
former regime WMD
personnel. 
Totals (all forces) 148,200.  Goal is 195,000
Training Training by 2,000 U.S. personnel as embeds and partners. 
Pre-operational training mostly at Jordan International Police
Training Center; Baghdad Police College and seven
academies around Iraq; and in UAE.  Countries doing training
aside from U.S.:  Canada, Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland,
UAE, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Germany
(now suspended), Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore,
Belgium, and Egypt.  
Facilities Protection
Service
Technically outside MOI.  About
145,000 security guards protecting
economic infrastructure.  
$53 million allocated
for this service thus far. 
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ISF Funding.  The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part
of U.S. policy.  The Administration has been shifting much U.S.  funding into this
training and equipping mission; according to the State Department,  a total of $5.036
billion in IRRF funds has  been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for,
and in some cases provide pay for) the ISF.  Of  those funds, about $4.912 billion has
been obligated as of May 30, and $4.519 billion of that has been disbursed.  A
FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an additional $5.7 billion
to equip and train the ISF, funds to be controlled by the Department of Defense and
provided to MNSTC-I.  (When spent, that would bring total ISF funding to $11
billion.)  The conference report on the FY2006 supplemental (H.R. 4939) provides
about $3 billion of those funds, but withholds the remaining ISF facilities
construction funding.  
Coalition-Building and Maintenance48
Some believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient efforts to
enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping originally and that the U.S.
mission in Iraq is being complicated by diminishing foreign military personnel
contributions.  As of June 2006, 28 other countries are contributing  20,000 forces,
but that total is expected to fall later in 2006.  Poland and Britain lead multinational
divisions in central and southern Iraq, respectively.  The UK-led force (UK forces
alone number about 7,500) is based in Basra; the Poland-led force (Polish forces
number 1,700, down 800 from 2005 levels ) is based in Hilla.  Poland says it might
withdraw its remaining forces by the end of 2006. 
  
The coalition in Iraq has been shrinking since Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of
its 1,300 troops.  Spain made that decision following the March 11, 2004 Madrid
bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had
supported the war effort.  Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
followed Spain’s withdrawal (900 total personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in
July 2004 after one of its citizens was taken hostage and threatened with beheading.
On the other hand, many nations are replacing their contingents with trainers for the
ISF or financial contributions or other assistance to Iraq.  Among other changes are
the following.
! Hungary completed a pullout of its 300 forces in December 2004.
! Italy has reduced its force from 3,200 in September 2005 to about
2,600 currently, based in the southern city of Nasiriyah (Dhi Qar
Province).  Italian officials plan to withdraw about 1,000 in June
2006, and new Prime Minister Romano Prodi says all Italian troops
will be out by the end of 2006.  
! Thailand, New Zealand, and Norway withdrew in early 2005, and
Norway’s 20 personnel were withdrawn in October 2005.  
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! In March 2005, the Netherlands withdrew almost all of its 1,350
troops.  Austrailian forces subsequently took over the Netherlands
force’s duty to help protect Japan’s forces in Samawa. 
! Ukraine, which lost eight of its soldiers in a January 2005  insurgent
attack, completed withdrawal of its remaining 1,500 forces after the
December 2005 elections.  
! Bulgaria pulled out  its 360-member unit after the December 15 Iraqi
elections.  However, in March 2006 it said it had sent in a 150-
person force to take over guard duties of Camp Ashraf, a base in
eastern Iraq where Iranian oppositionists are located.  
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005,
and, in line with a November 2005 decision, withdrew another 1,000
in May 2006, bringing its troop level to about 2,200 (based in Irbil
in Kurdish-controlled Iraq).  The remainder will stay through 2006.
! Japan’s parliament voted in mid-December 2005 to extend the
deployment of its 600-person military reconstruction contingent in
Samawah until as late as the end of 2006.  In May 2006, Japan said
its forces would withdraw when British and Australian forces leave
the Samawah area, which is to occur some time later in 2006. 
! Denmark said in May 2006 it will keep its forces in Iraq (Basra),
although it withdrew 80 of its 530-person force in May 2006. 
! Some countries have increased forces to compensate for
withdrawals.  Singapore deployed 180 troops in November 2004
after a hiatus of several months.  Azerbaijan also has increase forces.
! In February 2005, El Salvador agreed to send a replacement
contingent of 380 soldiers to replace those who are rotating out.
! In February 2005, Australia added 450 troops, bringing its
contribution to over 900. 
! In March 2005, Georgia sent an additional 550 troops to Iraq to help
guard the United Nations facilities, bringing its total Iraq deployment
to 850.  In March 2005, Albania increased its force by 50, giving it
about 120 troops in Iraq. 
NATO/EU/Other Offers of Civilian Training.  As noted above, all NATO
countries have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to
contribute funds or equipment.  Several NATO countries and others  are offering to
train not only Iraqi security but also civilian personnel.  In addition to the security
training offers discussed above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help
train Iraqi police, administrators, and judges outside Iraq.  At the June 22, 2005
Brussels conference discussed above, the EU pledged a  $130 million package to help
Iraq write its permanent constitution and reform government ministries; Norway
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offered energy sector cooperation, and Turkey offered to conduct seminars on
democracy for Iraqis.  Japan has made a similar offer on constitutional drafting, and
Malaysia has offered to train Iraqi civil servants.  The FY2005 supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $99 million to set up a regional counter-
terrorism center in Jordan to train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.  
In July 2004, then Secretary of State Powell said the United States would
consider a Saudi proposal for a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to
perform peacekeeping in Iraq, reportedly under separate command.  However, the
idea floundered because of opposition from potential contributing countries.  
Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy”
Some Members say that major new initiatives need to be considered to ensure
success of the U.S. mission in Iraq.  As U.S. public support for the U.S. commitment
in Iraq has appeared to decline, debates have emerged over several congressional
resolutions  proposing an “exit strategy.”  Some of the ideas widely circulated among
Members and other policy experts are discussed below. 
Troop Increase.  Some have said that the United States should increase its
troops in Iraq in an effort to prevent insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by
U.S. operations.  Some experts believe the extra troops needed for such an effort
might number about 100,000.49  The Administration asserts that U.S. commanders
feel that planned force levels are sufficient to complete the mission, and that U.S.
commanders are able to request additional forces, if needed.  About 700 additional
forces were sent to Iraq briefly following the February 22 Samarra bombing to help
prevent a descent into all out-civil war.  Some experts believe that troop level
increases  would aggravate Sunni Arabs already resentful of the U.S. intervention in
Iraq and that even many more U.S. troops would not necessarily produce stability and
would appear to deepen the U.S. commitment without a clear exit strategy.  Others
believe that increasing U.S. force levels would further the impression that the Iraqi
government depends on the United States for its survival. 
Immediate Withdrawal.  Some Members argue that the United States should
begin to withdraw virtually immediately.  Supporters of this position tend to argue
that the decision to invade Iraq and change its regime was a mistake in light of the
failure thus far to locate WMD, that a continued large U.S. presence in Iraq is
inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S.
casualties without securing U.S. national interests.  Those who take this position
include the approximately 50 Members of the “Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus,”
formed in June 2005.  In November 2005, Representative John Murtha, a ranking
member and former chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, publicly
articulated a similar position, calling for an “immediate” pullout (over six months).
His resolution (H.J.Res. 73) called for a U.S. withdrawal “at the earliest practicable
date” and the maintenance of an “over the horizon” U.S. presence to help the ISF.
A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written by Representative Duncan Hunter,
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chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), expressed the sense “that the
deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be terminated immediately;” it failed 403-3 on
November 18, 2005.  Other bills, such as H.R. 3142, H.Con.Res. 197,, state that it
[should be] U.S. policy not to maintain a permanent or long-term presence in Iraq.
The conference report on the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 4939)
omitted a provision to this effect that was in the House version.  
Withdrawal Timetable.  Another alternative is the setting of a timetable for
a U.S. withdrawal.  This has been exemplified by H.J.Res. 55, introduced by
Representative Neil Abercrombie, which calls on the Administration to begin a
withdrawal by October 2006.  H.Con.Res. 348, introduced by Representative Mike
Thompson, calls for a redeployment of U.S. forces no later than September 30, 2006.
In November 2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view that the United States needs
to force internal compromise in Iraq by threatening to withdraw, introduced an
amendment to S. 1042 (defense authorization bill)  to compel the Administration to
work on a timetable for withdrawal (during 2006).  Reportedly, on November 10,
2005, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee John Warner reworked the
Levin proposal into an amendment that stopped short of setting a timetable for
withdrawal but requires an Administration report on a “schedule for meeting
conditions” that could permit a U.S. withdrawal.  That measure, which also states in
its preamble that “2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi
sovereignty,” achieved bi-partisan support, passing 79-19.  It was incorporated, with
only slight modifications by House conferees, in the conference report on the bill
(H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-163).  Senator Russ Feingold expressed a  view similar
to that of Senator Levin in August 2005 when Senator Feingold  called for a
withdrawal of  U.S. forces by the end of 2006.  His resolution (S.Res. 171) calls for
the Administration to report to Congress on the time frame needed for the United
States to complete its mission.  A proposed amendment to S. 2766, the FY2007
defense authorization bill, would set December 31, 2006, as a timetable for a U.S.
withdrawal.  
Responding to the November 2005 congressional action, President Bush and
U.S. commanders remained adamant in their stated opposition to the setting of any
timetable for troop pullouts, let alone an immediate pullout.  During and after his
June 13, 2006, visit to Baghdad, President Bush again appeared to rule out a pullout
by stating that the United States would uphold its “commitment” to the Iraqi
government, although he did suggest in trip-related comments that Iraqi officials need
to plan their own future.  Supporters of such positions maintain that the Iraqi
government would collapse upon an immediate pullout, representing a victory for
terrorists.  On June 15, 2006, the House will debate H.Res. 861, introduced by
International Relations Committee chairman Henry Hyde, that would state that “it is
not in the national security interest of the United States to set an arbitrary date for the
withdrawal or redeployment” of U.S. forces from Iraq.  
Troop Reduction.  Senior U.S. military officials said in late 2005 that there
were plans for a substantial drawdown (40,000-50,000 of the total contingent) in
2006 if there is continued political progress and the insurgency does not escalate.
Such talk diminished in the wake of the post-February 22 Samarra bombing  violence
discussed above.  On April 26, 2006, the idea of a partial drawdown returned to
prominence when CNN reported that senior U.S. commanders were again indicating
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planning for a reduction of about 30,000 U.S. forces (5 brigades fewer than the 15
currently in Iraq) later in 2006, if security conditions permit.  However, that idea
again receded in June 2006 when  the Defense Department announced that  a U.S.
brigade (3,500 troops) that had been temporarily held in Germany would indeed
deploy to Iraq, and extra U.S. forces were sent from Kuwait to Ramadi to combat the
insurgency there. 
  
Power-Sharing Formulas.  Both the Administration and its critics have
identified the need to bring more  Sunni Arabs into the political process.  As noted,
U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad has been reaching out to Sunni groups, with some
success, and some believe that a key to progress in this effort will be U.S. ability to
persuade the Shiites and Kurds to agree to major amendments to the constitution
during the four month amendment process that begins after a new government is
seated.  An  unknown is what package of incentives, if any, would persuade most
Sunnis to end support for the insurgency and fully support the government.  Many
experts believe that the Sunnis will only settle for a share of power that is perhaps
slightly less than that wielded by the majority Shiites, even though the Shiites greatly
outnumber Sunni Arabs in Iraq.
Negotiating With the Insurgents.  In addition to exploring power sharing
arrangements with moderate Sunni leaders, the Administration appears to have
adopted a recommendation by early critics of U.S. policy to negotiate with some
Sunni figures representing the insurgency (including members of the MSA) and even
with some insurgent commanders.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld confirmed to
journalists in June 2005 that such discussions had taken place, and Iraqi President
Talabani said in May 2006 that he had had talks with insurgent factions as well.  The
U.S. talks reportedly have been intended to help U.S. forces defeat Zarqawi’s foreign
insurgent faction.  However, no major insurgent faction has lain down arms.  The
insurgents who have attended such talks reportedly want an increased role for Sunnis
in government and a withdrawal of U.S. and ISF forces from Sunni-inhabited areas.
Some  U.S. officials appear to believe that talking directly with insurgents increases
insurgent leverage and emboldens them to continue  attacks. 
 
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction.  Some believe that the key to
calming Iraq is to accelerate economic reconstruction.  According to this view,
accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment,
improving public services, and creating confidence in the government.  This idea
appears to have been incorporated into the President’s “National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq” document and the formation of the PRTs, as discussed above.  Others doubt
that economic improvement alone will produce major political results because the
differences among Iraq’s major communities are fundamental and resistant to
economic solutions.  In addition, the U.S. plan to transfer most reconstruction
management to Iraqis by the end of 2007 might indicate that the Administration has
not found this idea persuasive.
Partition or Decentralization.  Some commentators believe that Iraq cannot
be stabilized as one country and should be broken up into three separate countries:
one Kurdish, one Sunni Arab,  and one Shiite Arab.  However, many Middle East
experts believe the idea is unworkable because none of the three would likely be self-
sufficient and would likely fall firmly under the sway of Iraq’s powerful neighbors.
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Another version of this idea, propounded by Senator Biden and Council on
Foreign Relations expert Leslie Gelb (May 1, 2006, New York Times op-ed) is to
form three autonomous regions, dominated by each of the major communities.
According to the authors, doing so would ensure that these communities do not enter
an all-out civil war with each other.  Some believe that, to alleviate Iraqi concerns
about equitable distribution of oil revenues, an international organization should be
tapped to distribute Iraq’s oil revenues. 
Internationalization Options.  Some observers believe that the United
States needs to recruit international help in stabilizing Iraq.  One idea is to identify
a high-level international mediator to negotiate with Iraq’s major factions.  In a
possible move toward this option, in March 2006 President Bush appointed former
Secretary of State James Baker to head a congressionally recruited “Iraq Study
Group” to formulate options for U.S. policy in Iraq.  (The conference report on H.R.
4939 provides $1 million for operations of the group.)  However, there is no public
discussion, to date, that Baker himself might be such a mediator, and most experts
believe that a mediator, if selected, would likely need to come from a country that is
viewed by all Iraqis as neutral on internal political outcomes in Iraq.  Another idea
is to form a “contact group” of major countries and Iraqi neighbors to prevail on
Iraq’s factions to compromise.  This idea is reflected in S.J.Res. 36, introduced May
8, 2006, by Senator Kerry.  
CRS-43
Table 6.  U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition
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Notes:  According to the U.S. Government  Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s  Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003.  Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London.  The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs.  Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used.  In August  2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds.  The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq.  The figures above  do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources.  Much of the “war
crimes” funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks.  During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed.  Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs.  See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation, Apr. 2004.
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Figure 1.  Map of Iraq
